The ICRC report

The Iraqi cops we recruited found a way to enhance their inadequate salaries: shaking down other Iraqis by threatening to turn them over to us as members of the opposition.

Here’s the whole thing, as a humongous .pdf file. Kevin Drum has some of the juicy bits, but he leaves out my favorite:

Apparently the Iraqi police force we recruited were running a racket: Iraqis who refused to pay them off were turned over to the Coalition Forces as members of the opposition. “Many persons deprived of their liberty drew parallels between police practices of the occupation with those of the former regime.” (Sec 3.5, Par. 35, p. 16)

Feh. And the CPA knew about this months ago and didn’t bust any of the Iraqi cops? Are you still surprised ordinary Iraqis no longer think of us as liberators?

Author: Mark Kleiman

Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out. Books: Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken) When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993) Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989) UCLA Homepage Curriculum Vitae Contact: