So what does David Kay have to say for himself?

Here’s what he’s saying:

1. Saddam Hussein convinced his generals that he really had WMDs.

2. The exiles bamboozled the Administration into war by telling it what it wanted to hear. “They told us about weapons in order to get us to invade Iraq,” he said. “They moved U.S. policy, and we didn’t catch it.”

3. The war was a good idea, all the same. SH could and would have rebuilt his WMD stockpiles as soon as the sanctions went off, and they couldn’t stay on forever.

4. Kay warned about prisoner abuses, but no one in the military would listen.

5. Senior heads have to roll, or no one in the Middle East will believe that torture was an aberration rather than a policy choice.

Author: Mark Kleiman

Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out. Books: Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken) When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993) Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989) UCLA Homepage Curriculum Vitae Contact: Markarkleiman-at-gmail.com