In the latest issue of the Federation of American Scientists’ Public Interest Report, (not on the web yet, but soon available here) Robert Sherman argues that attacks on airliners using shoulder-launched missiles could be used by terrorists to devastate world air transport.
Sherman argues for “controllable enabling” (roughly the technology that makes your car stero not worth stealing) to reduce the damage from stolen weapons. He also tells a sad and entirely credible organizational-behavior story about why that wasn’t done years ago.
Author: Mark Kleiman
Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out.
Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken)
When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist
Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993)
Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989)
View all posts by Mark Kleiman