Not just the small arms?

Reuters reports

Equipment and materials that could be used to make nuclear weapons are disappearing from Iraq (news – web sites) but neither Baghdad nor Washington appears to have noticed, the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency reported on Monday.

Satellite imagery shows that entire buildings in Iraq have been dismantled. They once housed high-precision equipment that could help a government or terror group make nuclear bombs, the International Atomic Energy Agency said in a report to the U.N. Security Council.

Equipment and materials helpful in making bombs also have been removed from open storage areas in Iraq and disappeared without a trace, according to the satellite pictures, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said.

While some military goods that disappeared from Iraq after the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion, including missile engines, later turned up in scrap yards in the Middle East and Europe, none of the equipment or material known to the IAEA as potentially useful in making nuclear bombs has turned up yet, ElBaradei said.

The equipment — including high-precision milling and turning machines and electron-beam welders — and materials — such as high-strength aluminum — were tagged by the IAEA years ago, as part of the watchdog agency’s shutdown of Iraq’s nuclear program. U.N. inspectors then monitored the sites until their evacuation from Iraq just before the war.

The United States barred the inspectors’ return after the war, preventing the IAEA from keeping tabs on the equipment and materials up to the present day.

Under anti-proliferation agreements, the U.S. occupation authorities who administered Iraq until June, and then the Iraqi interim government that took power at the end of June, would have to inform the IAEA if they moved or exported any of that material or equipment.

But no such reports have been received since the invasion, officials of the watchdog agency said.

The United States also has not publicly commented on earlier U.N. inspectors’ reports disclosing the dismantling of a range of key weapons-making sites, raising the question of whether it was unable to monitor the sites.

‘WE SIMPLY DON’T KNOW’

In the absence of any U.S. or Iraqi accounting, council diplomats said the satellite images could mean the gear had been moved to new sites inside Iraq or stolen. If stolen, it could end up in the hands of a government or terrorist group seeking nuclear weapons.

“We simply don’t know, although we are trying to get the information,” said one council diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity.

U.S. officials had no immediate comment on the report.

“Had no immediate comment?” Could this have been a surprise? Either we know where the stuff is, and should say so, or we don’t. Right now, I’d bet on “don’t.”

AP has a similar story, adding these details:

As a result of the IAEA’s ongoing review of satellite photos and follow-up investigations, ElBaradei said, ”the IAEA continues to be concerned about the widespread and apparently systematic dismantlement that has taken place at sites previously relevant to Iraq’s nuclear program and sites previously subject to ongoing monitoring and verification by the agency.”

”The imagery shows in many instances the dismantlement of entire buildings that housed high precision equipment … formerly monitored and tagged with IAEA seals, as well as the removal of equipment and materials (such as high-strength aluminum) from open storage areas,” he said.

If we didn’t have enough boots on the ground to guard this equpment, then we didn’t have enough boots on the ground, period.

Remind me again of how the war made us more secure?

Author: Mark Kleiman

Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out. Books: Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken) When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993) Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989) UCLA Homepage Curriculum Vitae Contact: Markarkleiman-at-gmail.com