“It’s impossible to believe they didn’t know”

The Times has more detail on the Haditha massacre and cover-up.

Boy, did Mike O’Hare call this one right. He seems to have been reading tomorrow’s New York Times by precognition.

Note that the Marine Commandant, unlike the warbloggers who have been ranting about Murtha’s statements, seems to know that the level of certainty necessary to justify administrative action (let alone the expression of opinion) isn’t “proof beyond reasonable doubt.” The presumption of innocence doesn’t mean you get to keep your job.

(Emphasis added below.)

June 3, 2006

Initial Response to Marine Raid Draws Scrutiny

By DAVID S. CLOUD and ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON, June 2 — Marine commanders in Iraq learned within two days of the killings in Haditha last November that Iraqi civilians had died from gunfire, not a roadside bomb as initially reported, but the officers involved saw no reason to investigate further, according to a senior Marine officer.

The commanders have told investigators they had not viewed as unusual, in a combat environment, the discrepancies that emerged almost immediately in accounts about how the two dozen Iraqis died, and that they had no information at the time suggesting that any civilians had been killed deliberately.

But the handling of the matter by the senior Marine commanders in Haditha, and whether officers and enlisted personnel tried to cover up what happened or missed signs suggesting that the civilian killings were not accidental, has become a major element of the investigation by an Army general into the entire episode.

Officials have said that the investigation, while not yet complete, is likely to conclude that a small group of marines carried out the unprovoked killings of two dozen civilians in the hours after a makeshift bomb killed a marine.

A senior Marine general familiar with the investigation, which is being led by Maj. Gen. Eldon A. Bargewell of the Army, said in an interview that it had not yet established how high up the chain of command culpability for the killings extended. But he said there were strong suspicions that some officers knew that the Marine squad’s version of events had enough holes and discrepancies that it should have been looked into more deeply.

“It’s impossible to believe they didn’t know,” the Marine general said, referring to midlevel and senior officers. “You’d have to know this thing stunk.” He was granted anonymity, along with others who described the investigation, because he was not authorized to speak publicly about it.

In recent weeks, investigators have interviewed the Marine commanders who were serving in Iraq at the time of the killings, including Maj. Gen. Stephen T. Johnson, commander of the Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq, and Maj. Gen. Richard A. Huck, commander of the Second Marine Division, a senior Pentagon adviser said.

Military officials said Friday that interviews with all senior officers in the chain of command were a routine part of any wide-ranging inquiry, and did not necessarily indicate culpability on their part.

But even before the investigation is completed, the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Michael Hagee, is considering relieving some senior Marine commanders who served in Iraq at the time of the killings, the Pentagon adviser said, citing what the adviser called a “loss of confidence” in those officers.

General Hagee has not decided whether to relieve any of the officers in positions of command, and was said to be weighing whether such a move would damage morale and be seen as prejudging the outcome of the investigation.

Lt. Col. Scott Fazekas, a Marine spokesman, said he had “no information” about the possibility of officers being relieved.

[snip]

Another officer, who served with the Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq and has been questioned by investigators, said in an interview that he recalled nothing in the reports on the Nov. 19 killings that indicated marines had acted improperly after their convoy was hit that morning by a roadside bomb.

He acknowledged that the initial reports from the field indicated inaccurately that noncombatants were killed in the bomb explosion. The Marines also issued a press release the day after the killings that said 15 Iraqi civilians had died in the bomb blast and 8 insurgents had been killed in an ensuing firefight.

Yet debriefings on Nov. 20 gave rise to another version of events. Marines at the site said that the civilians had been killed by cross-fire during a firefight with suspected insurgents, the officials said.

Investigators have since come to the view that 24 civilians died, apparently from shots fired at them by Americans, and not as random victims of stray bullets in a gunfight.

But the senior officer said, “On the 19th and 20th of November, there was no information to indicate there was a law of war violation.”

The fact that Iraqis were killed by gunfire, not by the bomb explosion, did not raise any red flags because marines were saying that insurgents had been firing at them after the bomb went off, he said. In addition, the bomb attack that morning was followed by a series of other insurgent attacks that day, further confusing the situation.

In retrospect, he said, it might have been advisable to correct the inaccurate press release, but the Marines did not consider doing that then. Investigators have been examining whether there were signs of a cover-up by marines that senior officers missed or ignored, including the circumstances of the shooting of five Iraqi men in a taxi shortly after the roadside bomb exploded.

[snip]

Author: Mark Kleiman

Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out. Books: Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken) When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993) Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989) UCLA Homepage Curriculum Vitae Contact: Markarkleiman-at-gmail.com

2 thoughts on ““It’s impossible to believe they didn’t know””

  1. The military will conduct an investigation and determine, as they did with Ishaqi, that everyone is innocent. The Iraqis including the children shot themselves.

  2. Actually, those were Bosnians who shot and killed themselves – disguised as Iraqis. And no Americans were involved. Those were Serbs disguised as Americans.

Comments are closed.