That’s what Pakistan’s Information Minister calls the U.S./NATO effort in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani Minister of Information just told the BBC that the upsurge of Taliban-style activity in the tribal regions of Pakistan was due to the “failure” — his word — of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
I offer this not, as the lawyers say, for the truth of the assertion — on average there’s probably a negative correlation between what Musharraf’s mouthpiece says and the truth — but for Musharraf’s willingness to sell his friend Mr. Bush down the river. I hope some enterprising reporter asks Tony Snow whether the President agrees with the Prime Minister’s assessment.
Bush’s cynical decision to adopt Musharraf as “our sonufabitch” is looking worse and worse, and Obama’s announced willingness to back the return of Pakistan to democratic (or at least civilian) rule is looking better and better.
Author: Mark Kleiman
Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out.
Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken)
When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist
Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993)
Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989)
View all posts by Mark Kleiman