Some time ago, I applied Dukefield’s Law — “If a thing is worth winning, it’s worth cheating for” — to the problem of incentive-management systems such as high-stakes school testing programs. Now, with a helpful hint from Glenn Loury, I’ve formulated that problem in the context of principal/agent theory.
No paper yet, but if you happen to be in Los Angeles with a couple of hours to kill tomorrow (Friday) afternoon, I’ll be giving a lecture on the topic as part of the Marschak Colloquim series.
Anderson School Room C-301, 1 p.m. – 3 p.m.
Here’s the announcement, with an abstract.
Author: Mark Kleiman
Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out.
Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken)
When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist
Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993)
Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989)
View all posts by Mark Kleiman