Does this sound familiar?

Is the intelligence reform bill Flawed by Design, Part II?

In Flawed by Design my colleague Amy Zegart explains why the nominal authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over the non-CIA parts of the intelligence community and the nominal authority of the (pre-Goldwater-Nichols) Joint Chiefs over the armed services never really worked: they were designed by Congress not to work, in order to protect the interests of Congressionally favored bureaucracies. The Navy didn’t want the Joint Chiefs to be able to interfere with its affairs, and the War Department (which became the Department of Defense), along with the State Department, didn’t want the DCI to be able interfere with their own intelligence-gathering and analysis.

Given the current contortions over the intelligence reform bill, I think Amy has all the material she needs for a sequel.

Author: Mark Kleiman

Professor of Public Policy at the NYU Marron Institute for Urban Management and editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. Teaches about the methods of policy analysis about drug abuse control and crime control policy, working out the implications of two principles: that swift and certain sanctions don't have to be severe to be effective, and that well-designed threats usually don't have to be carried out. Books: Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken) When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton, 2009; named one of the "books of the year" by The Economist Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results (Basic, 1993) Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Greenwood, 1989) UCLA Homepage Curriculum Vitae Contact: