NPR has a story on the legal use of genetic information to discriminate (underwrite, set premiums) in the private Long Term Care (LTC) insurance market. I am the first author of the paper that Bob Green (the P.I. of the underlying study) is discussing in the NPR piece and I have blogged about its findings here and here.
The basic story of the paper in Health Affairs is that persons with at least one copy of the e4 variant of the APOE-4 genotype were found to be both more likely to move to a nursing home in a community cohort of elderly persons living in 5 N.C. counties, as well as being found in the REVEAL II study to alter their behavior upon finding out they were at increased risk of AD, including making changes such as buying Long Term Care Insurance. In short, this is adverse selection whereby consumers have information that companies do not, a story that likely keeps insurance executives up at night.
The biggest news of the segment was the report that Genworth, the largest seller of LTC Insurance in the U.S. acknowledged that the The Genetic Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008 does not ban the use of genetic markers to underwrite their product, and they stated they wished to keep this option available to do so (some states have moved to do so). I blogged at some length on this back on October 2011 (that it was allowed for LTC Insurance), but I have never heard anyone from the LTC Insurance industry acknowledge they wanted to keep this option.
I think it is a mistake to take a reflexive “see the insurance companies are bad” response to this story, and that in Long Term Care especially, we need some renewed thinking about what ‘fairness’ means.
The general idea behind GINA 2008 is that you cannot pick your genes, so to discriminate against someone on that basis is unfair. This makes general sense to me, and likely to most people. However, in a private insurance market with very low penetration (~less than 7-10% of persons in age ranges to consider such products buy them; this post highlights the many reasons) what constitutes fairness is not as clear. An average risk person who wants a LTC policy because they have no children, for example, yet who ends up paying a higher than warranted premium due to adverse selection in the market (those with higher risks signing up) could also be viewed as being harmed in an unfair manner.The chart below lays out how different scenarios of who knows genetic information in LTC could influence uptake and premiums. The table is meant as food for thought.
The bottom line answer to planning for LTC is risk pooling, and if ever there were a risk distribution that called out for social insurance it is LTC. That seems impossible politically at this time. However, the LTC system in this country is a patch work mess that is in need of some sustained policy efforts. This post has a weeks worth of links on planning for LTC, from both an individual and population basis if you want more. Long Term Care is always the forgotten topic until someone in your family needs it.
crossposted at freeforall